The Compromise Verdict: How the Court\u27s resolution of New Jersey v. Delaware III Implicitly Advanced Enviromental Litigation by Pratt, Joel M.
Seattle Journal of Environmental Law 
Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 1 
5-31-2015 
The Compromise Verdict: How the Court's resolution of New 
Jersey v. Delaware III Implicitly Advanced Enviromental Litigation 
Joel M. Pratt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjel 
Recommended Citation 
Pratt, Joel M. (2015) "The Compromise Verdict: How the Court's resolution of New Jersey v. Delaware III 
Implicitly Advanced Enviromental Litigation," Seattle Journal of Environmental Law: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 
1. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjel/vol5/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal of Environmental 
Law by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
The Compromise Verdict: How the Court's resolution of New Jersey v. Delaware 
III Implicitly Advanced Enviromental Litigation 
Cover Page Footnote 
I extend my sincerest appreciation to Professor Sara Gosman, then at the University of Michigan Law 
School, for teaching me more about the Supreme Court than I ever thought I could learn and for help 
editing this article. In addition, I am grateful for the work of the editors of the Seattle Journal of 
Environmental Law, whose work improved this piece immensely. 




The Compromise Verdict: How the Court’s Resolution of 
New Jersey v. Delaware III Implicitly Advanced 
Environmental Litigation 
Joel M. Pratt† 
New Jersey and Delaware have often fought over their territorial 
boundaries in the Delaware River. Three times, they have litigated 
cases in the Supreme Court under the Court’s original jurisdiction to 
hear cases or controversies between states. In 1905, a Compact ne-
gotiated by the states and confirmed by Congress settled the first case 
between the two states. The second case between the two states led 
the Supreme Court to issue a Decree confirming the boundaries of 
the two states. The third case, which began in 2005, asked the Court 
to decide the scope of each state’s power to regulate development in 
the Delaware River. The Court came up with a compromise, argued 
for by neither state, which gave lasting effect to the 1905 Compact 
between the states while recognizing how water regulation has de-
veloped over the last century. The Court’s resolution, though seem-
ingly counterintuitive, can be best understood with reference to fed-
eral and state common law principles. More important, however, is 
how the case was argued. Though it presented a traditional “envi-
ronment v. the economy” debate, the party supporting the pro-envi-
ronment argument (Delaware) did not argue it as such. This case, 
therefore, presents a roadmap to victory for environmentalists in 
front of the Roberts Court: to win an environmental case, it may be 
best to avoid mentioning the environment at all. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In response to a threat from New Jersey to remove state investments 
in Delaware banks, Delaware’s legislature considered authorizing the 
National Guard to protect Delaware and resist New Jersey’s 
encroachment.1 One New Jersey state legislator openly contemplated 
commissioning a battleship docked in a museum “in the event the State 
was forced to repel an armed invasion from Delaware.”2 These events are 
not a historical recounting of the early days of the United States; they 
occurred in 2005.3  
 New Jersey and Delaware have been fighting for jurisdiction over the 
Delaware River for more than a century.4 Three times, these fights have 
resulted in litigation in the Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction.5 
The first case arose in 19076 and was dismissed as a result of an agreement 
between the states, which was ratified by Congress.7 The second case 
                                                 
1. Report of the Special Master at 21, New Jersey v. Delaware III, 552 U.S. 597 (2008) (No. 134, 
Original) [hereinafter Special Master Report]. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 2. 
5. Id. at 2, 14, 17. 
6. New Jersey v. Delaware I, 205 U.S. 550 (1907). 
7. S. 4975, 59th Cong., 34 Stat. 858 (1907). See Special Master Report, supra note 1, at 13. 




established the boundary between the states.8 The third case is the subject 
of this article.  
 Other commentators have focused largely on the inconsistencies in 
the Court’s resolution of this dispute.9 This article seeks to do the opposite. 
The Court’s Opinion can be understood squarely in the context of federal 
common law and state water law and is, thus, neither illegitimate nor 
unpredictable.10 This article argues that the Supreme Court’s resolution of 
New Jersey v. Delaware III in properly balancing states’ interests in 
accordance with general common law principles gives environmental 
advocates a roadmap to properly frame, argue, and win environmental 
cases. This article proceeds in three parts. Part II explores the history of 
the conflict between the two states and explains the factual background of 
the controversy. Part III analyzes the development of each side’s 
arguments—from the proceedings in front of the Special Master to the 
Oral Arguments before the Supreme Court—and concludes with an 
explication of the Court’s Opinion. Part IV then synthesizes the Court’s 
resolution with long-standing legal principles. Ultimately, the non-
environmental framework of this case allowed the Court to cut across 
ideology to give pro-environmental regulations a decisive, legally 
consistent, and narrowly drawn victory.  
II. THE DISPUTE 
 “Disputes between New Jersey and Delaware concerning the 
boundary along the Delaware River . . . have persisted almost from the 
beginning of statehood.”11 This historic conflict carried into the twenty-
first century, where it took the form of a dispute over a gas pipeline. 
Section II.A explains the historical dispute between New Jersey and 
Delaware. Section II.B describes the factual dispute that led to this lawsuit.  
                                                 
8. Delaware I, 205 U.S. 550. 
9. See D. David DeWald, Police Power Versus Riparian Rights in the Interstate Compact 
Context, New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. 1410 (2008), 88 NEB. L. REV. 433 (2009) (proposing an 
alternative to the test adopted by the Court in New Jersey v. Delaware III). See also Norene Napper, 
Case Note, Water Law--States’ Rights and Riparian Rights—Riparian Jurisdiction: Ordinary and 
Usual v. Extraordinary, 76 TENN. L. REV. 187 (2008) (attacking the legitimacy and predictability of 
the new test announced in New Jersey v. Delaware III).  
10. See infra Part IV. 
11. New Jersey v. Delaware III, 552 U.S. 597, 603 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
citing New Jersey v. Delaware II, 291 U.S. 361, 376 (1934). 
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 A. History of Conflict  
 First, it is important to define the precise geographical area in contest. 
Inside of the so-called “Twelve-Mile Circle,”12 Delaware claimed 
ownership of the Delaware River and the “subaqueous soil up to the low-
water mark on the New Jersey side.”13 New Jersey claimed ownership of 
the river and the subaqueous soil up to the thalweg.14  
 The conflict between the two states flared up for the first time near 
the end of the nineteenth century. In 1871, Delaware’s legislature passed 
a statute requiring fishing licenses on the Delaware River. Delaware 
residents paid five dollars for the privilege to fish in this area; nonresidents 
paid twenty dollars.15 The following year, “Delaware arrested several New 
Jersey citizens at gunpoint” for fishing on the river without the requisite 
licenses.16 The arrests set off a chain of fruitless negotiations, which ended 
with New Jersey suing Delaware in 1877.17 
 The Court never issued an opinion on the merits in this first lawsuit 
because the parties settled the dispute with a Compact in 1905.18 In 1907, 
Congress ratified the Compact, giving it both the structure of a contract 
and the force of federal law.19 The Compact contains nine articles,20 only 
                                                 
12. The Twelve-Mile Circle is an area of land and water, centered on New Castle, Delaware, 
with a diameter of twelve miles. See New Jersey’s Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment to the Special Master at 47, New Jersey v. Delaware III, 552 U.S. 597 (2008) (No. 134, 
Original), available at http://goo.gl/lEx1g2 [hereinafter New Jersey Special Master Brief] for a 
relatively clear visual representation of the area. 
13. Delaware III, 552 U.S. at 605.  
14. Special Master Report, supra note 1 at 15. The thalweg is the area of strongest current, 
typically close to or in the middle of the river. Id. Delaware’s claim to the entire river was based on “a 
deed of feoffment from the Duke of York to William Penn on August 24, 1682.” Id. In other words, 
within the Twelve-Mile Circle, Delaware claimed ownership of the river and subaqueous soil 
extending to the low tide line on the New Jersey side of the river, while New Jersey claimed that each 
state owned half of the river and soil. 
15. Id. at 3. 
16. Id. at 3–4. The New Jersey citizens were fishing on the part of the river New Jersey claimed 
as its own. Id. at 4. 
17. Id. at 5. 
18. Id. at 8. 
19. Report of the Special Master Apps. at B-1, New Jersey v. Delaware III, 552 U.S. 597 (2008) 
(No. 134, Original) [hereinafter Appendices]. 
20. Id. at B-2–B-6. Articles I and II use parallel language to give the States of New Jersey and 
Delaware the ability to serve civil and criminal process upon individuals anywhere on the Delaware 
River. Id. at B-2–B-3. This ability is essentially limited only by the state’s jurisdiction over the 
criminal and civil defendant. Id. Article III gives the States common rights of fishing. Article IV directs 
the States to appoint a commission charged with the drafting of uniform fishing laws. Id. at B-3–B-5. 
Article V preserves the status quo with respect to fishing laws, except those that are inconsistent with 
common fishing rights. Id. at B-5. Article VI preserves the status quo with respect to oysters and other 
shellfish. Id. Article IX directs the way by which the Compact will be ratified and further mandates 
the dismissal of the pending lawsuit upon passage. Id. 




two of which—Articles VII and VIII—were at play in this dispute. Article 
VII provides: “Each state may, on its own side of the river, continue to 
exercise riparian jurisdiction of every kind and nature, and to make grants, 
leases, and conveyances of riparian lands and rights under the laws of the 
respective states.”21 Article VIII states: “Nothing herein contained shall 
affect the territorial limits, rights, or jurisdiction of either State of, in, or 
over the Delaware River, or the ownership of the subaqueous soil thereof, 
except as herein expressly set forth.”22 It is the interpretation of this text 
that drives the advocacy and decision-making in the recent dispute.  
 Though the subject of the conflict was ownership of the Delaware 
River, the Compact did not actually settle the boundary between the two 
states.23 Instead, the Supreme Court decided that controversy in 1935.24 
Delaware won.25 Within the Twelve-Mile Circle, Delaware owns the river 
and subaqueous soil up to the low water mark on New Jersey’s shore. 
Below the Circle, the boundary line is the thalweg.26 
 The two states also have an uneven history of regulation. New Jersey 
argued that it regulated riparian developments appurtenant to its own 
shores since at least 1854.27 By contrast, Delaware’s first regulatory 
statutes over the same water arose more than a century later.28 Until 1969, 
Delaware regulated riparian developments in an extremely limited way 
using common law nuisance principles, rather than comprehensive 
statutory regulations.29 After 1969, however, Delaware did claim 
regulatory authority over any projects within the Twelve-Mile Circle; New 
Jersey and Delaware worked together to approve and regulate 
                                                 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Special Master Report, supra note 1, at 8. 
24. Decree, New Jersey v. Delaware II, 295 U.S. 694 (1935). 
25. Id. at 694. “Within the twelve mile circle (that is, within the circle the radius of which is 
twelve miles, and the center of which is the building used prior to 1881 as the courthouse at New 
Castle, Delaware, certain arcs of which are hereafter described and determined), the Delaware River 
and the subaqueous soil thereof up to mean low water line on the easterly or New Jersey side is 
adjudged to belong to the State of Delaware, and the true boundary line between the States within said 
twelve mile circle is adjudged to be mean low water mark on the easterly or New Jersey side of the 
Delaware River.” Id. 
26. Id. 
27. New Jersey Special Master Brief, supra note 12, at 4. 
28. Special Master Report, supra note 1, at 18. 
29. Id. at 69. 
6 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 5:1 
 
development in the river, even developments appurtenant to New Jersey’s 
shore.30  
B. The Most Recent Dispute 
 In September of 2004, Crown Landing, LLC, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of British Petroleum (BP), applied to Delaware for permits to 
begin testing and construction of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) transfer 
system in the Delaware River.31 The facility would be inside of the 
Twelve-Mile Circle, appurtenant to New Jersey’s shore.32 Delaware issued 
a status decision in February of 2005 that the project would violate 
Delaware’s environment-protecting prohibitions of “offshore bulk transfer 
[facilities]” and “heavy industrial [uses].”33 BP pursued an administrative 
appeal in Delaware, which it lost, and Delaware never issued any permits 
for the project.34  
 New Jersey, with jobs at stake, did not take this decision lightly. After 
a series of communications between New Jersey and Delaware, the Court 
granted New Jersey leave to file a new Bill of Complaint.35 Delaware 
answered New Jersey’s complaint and “moved for appointment of a 
Special Master.”36 In 2006, the Court appointed Ralph I. Lancaster, Jr. as 
Special Master.37 Ultimately, the Court would be tasked to decide between 
                                                 
30. Id. at 74–76. Of particular importance to the case at hand was that “Delaware rejected as 
prohibited bulk transfer facility El Paso Eastern Company’s request to build an LNG unloading facility 
extending from New Jersey into Delaware.” Reply Brief of Delaware in Response to Exceptions by 
New Jersey to the Report of the Special Master at 8, New Jersey v. Delaware III, 552 U.S. 597 (2008) 
(No. 134, Original) [hereinafter Delaware Supreme Court Brief]. 
31. Special Master Report, supra note 1, at 19–20. For the purposes of this article, most notably 
the filing of the Amicus Brief, there is no relevant distinction between Crown Landing, LLC and BP. 
The remainder of the article will refer to the interested private party in this case as BP. 
32. Id. at 20. 
33. Id.  
34. Id. at 20–21.  
35. Id. at 24. 
36. Id.  
37. Id. The parties submitted almost 6,500 pages to the Special Master, who considered the 
evidence and the parties’ arguments and submitted a Report to the Supreme Court. Id. at 27. New 
Jersey then filed a brief excepting to the Report, to which Delaware filed an opposing brief. The Court 
heard Oral Argument on November, 27, 2007 and issued its Opinion on March 31, 2008. New Jersey 
v. Delaware III, 552 U.S. 597, 601 (2008). For the purpose of understanding the decision, it is useful 
to think about the Special Master’s Report as a lower court’s opinion. Though the Supreme Court 
heard this case under its original jurisdiction, the Court left the findings of fact and initial decision-
making to the Special Master. There are legally significant differences between the Special Master’s 
Report and the Court’s Opinion and Decree. Ultimately, because the Supreme Court hears the vast 
majority of its cases under its appellate jurisdiction, the Court’s structure is ill fitted to decide this kind 
of case. Therefore, the Court structured this case so that it could decide it as if it were an appellate 
case.  




New Jersey’s desire to permit the LNG transfer system and Delaware’s 
prohibition of it.  
III. THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS 
 New Jersey and Delaware argued this case from 2005 to 2007, first 
in front of the Special Master and then in front of the Supreme Court. This 
Section tracks the evolution of the parties’ arguments, the Special Master’s 
response to them, and the Supreme Court’s ultimate resolution of the 
dispute. Section III.A explores New Jersey’s arguments, while Section 
III.B explores Delaware’s. Section III.C explicates the resolution of the 
dispute, first by the Special Master and then by the Court.   
A. New Jersey’s Arguments 
 New Jersey advanced two principal legal arguments. First, New 
Jersey argued that the text of the 1905 Compact gave New Jersey exclusive 
jurisdiction to regulate all riparian developments appurtenant to its own 
shore.38 This was a key argument for New Jersey; if the Court were to 
accept this argument, New Jersey would win because Delaware’s laws 
would not apply, and the Crown Landing project could go forward.39 
Though these textual arguments were dispositive of the issue, New Jersey 
did not spend the majority of its brief to the Special Master arguing these 
points.40 Like most textual arguments, New Jersey’s can be met with an 
equal and opposite interpretation;41 a factual argument, then, makes New 
Jersey’s case substantially more appealing. 
 New Jersey made more compelling textual arguments to the Court 
than to the Special Master because of Delaware’s big win on the facts in 
                                                 
38. New Jersey Special Master Brief, supra note 12, at 26. On the text of the Compact itself, 
New Jersey makes three sub-arguments. One, New Jersey argues that the right to wharf out (build a 
dock) is a long-recognized, historical right attendant to ownership of riparian land. Id. at 27. See, e.g., 
Recent Decisions, Navigable Waters: Riparian Rights: Wharfing Out, 5 MICH. L. REV. 709–10 (1907). 
Two, New Jersey argues that the Compact’s use of the phrase “riparian jurisdiction of every kind and 
nature” confers upon New Jersey the full police power to regulate the wharf. New Jersey Special 
Master Brief, supra note 12, at 29. Third, New Jersey claims that laws to protect the public, including 
“New Jersey’s environmental laws,” are included in the Compact’s grant of authority and, thus, 
jurisdiction can be exercised only by New Jersey. Id. at 32. 
39. See generally, Wharf Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/wharf (last visited Sept. 29, 2014) ("Wharf: a flat structure that is built along 
the shore of a river, ocean, etc., so that ships can load and unload cargo or passengers.").  
40. New Jersey Special Master Brief, supra note 12 at 23–32.  
41. See infra Section III.B.  
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front of the Special Master.42 First, New Jersey carefully parsed the text to 
argue that, by granting “each state” the authority to “exercise riparian 
jurisdiction of every kind and nature,” this could only mean the grant of 
exclusive jurisdiction to each state on its own side of the Delaware River; 
given that wharfing out is a core riparian right, the state that owns the land 
to which the wharf is attached should be the one with exclusive rights to 
regulate. 43 
 New Jersey also argued that the grant of “riparian jurisdiction” 
includes the sole right to regulate activities on the wharf once the wharf 
has been approved.44 New Jersey has to win this part of the argument as 
well because the right to regulate riparian land does not necessarily carry 
with it the right to regulate the activities on the wharf itself, because the 
dock would have been grounded in Delaware’s subaqueous soil.45 
 The essence of New Jersey’s second major legal argument is a fact-
based, adverse-possession-styled argument. Just as one who has openly 
and adversely possessed land for a long period may acquire title to the 
land, New Jersey argued that, because they have historically exercised 
exclusive regulation of the Twelve-Mile Circle, exclusive authority is 
vested in New Jersey. Because Delaware did not enact any comprehensive 
regulatory scheme until 1969, and New Jersey had developed and 
regulated for more than one hundred years before that, New Jersey argued 
that it had acquired the exclusive right to regulate through prescription and 
acquiescence.46 Though New Jersey’s brief to the Special Master only 
devoted a small portion of the brief to this argument,47 a good portion of 
its Statement of Facts addressed this issue.48 New Jersey’s arguments were 
thus not solely based on the text of the Compact. New Jersey, having been 
a long-standing steward of the river, wants the right to regulate it for both 
economic and environmental benefits. Having had so little involvement in 
managing riparian developments in the river, Delaware cannot claim 
sweeping authority once it happened to disapprove of New Jersey’s plans. 
In front of the Supreme Court, New Jersey also incorporated the “course 
of conduct” argument into its textual argument. By invoking the words 
                                                 
42. See infra Section III.C.  
43. Exceptions by New Jersey to the Report of the Special Master and Supporting Brief at III-
IV, New Jersey v. Delaware III, 552 U.S. 597 (2008) (No. 134, Original) [hereinafter New Jersey 
Supreme Court Brief].  
44. New Jersey Special Master Brief, supra note 12, at 32–41.  
45. See infra Section III.B for Delaware’s argument about the scope of its police power. See 
infra Section III.C for the Special Master’s favorable treatment of Delaware’s argument.  
46. New Jersey Special Master Brief, supra note 12, at 41.  
47. Id. at iii. 
48. Id. at 4–5; 10–11; 14–23.  




“continue to exercise riparian jurisdiction,” New Jersey argued that the 
language of the Compact reaffirms the parties’ long-standing relationship 
in exercising riparian jurisdiction, under which New Jersey had regulated 
developments on its own side of the river without interference from 
Delaware.49  
 At Oral Argument, the Justices were primarily concerned with setting 
appropriate limits on New Jersey’s jurisdiction to regulate lands that 
belong to Delaware. Even Justice Scalia, who ended up voting in favor of 
New Jersey,50 pressed New Jersey’s lawyer on this point: “So, obviously, 
the right to wharf out does not include the right to use the wharf for 
whatever you like, and the only thing we're arguing about is whether it is 
New Jersey or Delaware that can impose limitations.”51 Even those 
Justices favoring New Jersey’s position were thus not prepared to accept 
New Jersey’s argument that attaching a wharf to New Jersey’s shore grants 
it exclusive regulatory authority, even over those activities on the wharf.52  
 Additionally, we must pause here to note what New Jersey did not 
do—namely, argue this case as an “environmental” case. New Jersey 
could have argued that the merits of its economic vitality are more 
important than Delaware’s business-hostile, pro-environmental laws. That 
argument was harder for New Jersey to make than it was for BP, who was 
the party with the strongest direct economic interest in this case. BP, 
however, chose not to pursue its case further in Delaware administrative 
or state courts. Though it is unclear why BP chose not to pursue remedies 
in Delaware’s courts, the decision had profound structural consequences 
for the case and strategic consequences for the attorneys. In arguing on the 
Compact, instead of on the merits of the permit denial, the “pro-business” 
interest in this case was deprived of an extremely potent set of arguments 
weighing the value of a proposed project against environmental interests.  
                                                 
49. Id. at 28–30.  
50. New Jersey v. Delaware III, 552 U.S. at 629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
51. Oral Argument at 15:37, New Jersey v. Delaware III, 552 U.S. 597 (2008) (No. 134, 
Original), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_134_orig [hereinafter Oral 
Argument].  
52. Justice Souter was especially troubled by New Jersey’s argument that it could regulate, 
saying that the “only way” to accept New Jersey’s position is “to give New Jersey the power to grant 
Delaware land.” Oral Argument, supra note 51, at 5:35. Justice Ginsburg is understandably concerned 
that Delaware would “give up” such an “extraordinary power” with the vague language of Article VII 
of the Compact. Oral Argument, supra note 51, at 17:48.  
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B. Delaware’s Arguments 
 Delaware’s core argument was simple: states get to exercise 
sovereign power within their own borders. Arguing to the Special Master, 
Delaware made the strongest version of this argument available: after 
confirming the “baseline rule” that a state has exclusive jurisdiction to 
regulate activities in its own territory,53 Delaware argued that Article VII 
of the Compact gave each state the right to regulate riparian developments 
on its “own side of the river,” which would preclude New Jersey from 
regulating within the Twelve-Mile Circle at all.54 Because New Jersey v. 
Delaware II drew New Jersey’s boundary at the low water mark on its own 
side of the Delaware River, Delaware argued that any regulatory authority 
over the Delaware river outshore of the low water mark rested exclusively 
with Delaware.55 Delaware’s extensive treatment of this argument 
indicates the importance of it for Delaware’s interests; if the Court were 
to accept this argument, New Jersey would lose all independent regulatory 
authority over riparian developments within the Twelve-Mile Circle, so 
long as those riparian developments actually extended into the water.56  
 Delaware did not, however, rely exclusively on the strongest version 
of this argument. Instead, Delaware dedicated some space in its briefs to a 
more moderate version of the same argument: accepting that New Jersey 
has “riparian jurisdiction” to regulate riparian developments, Delaware 
still has the full police power to determine if the activity on the wharves 
extended into Delaware’s sovereign territory.57 This argument accepts the 
conclusion that New Jersey does have jurisdiction to approve and regulate 
wharves for the purpose of accessing navigable water,58 but it also affords 
Delaware the police power to regulate activities on those wharves for the 
benefit of its own people.  In other words, riparian jurisdiction ends once 
the wharf is built; after that, the owner of the subaqueous soil can regulate 
for the benefit of the citizens of the sovereign state.  
 Despite New Jersey’s heavy reliance on course of conduct 
arguments, Delaware barely mentioned this issue to the Special Master. It 
                                                 
53. Delaware’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief at 25, New Jersey v. 
Delaware III, 552 U.S. 597 (2008) (No. 134, Original), available at http://goo.gl/XtUrr2  [hereinafter 
Delaware Special Master Brief]. 
54. Id. at 26.  
55. Id. at 26–35.  
56. All developments would extend into the water. Nobody would build a dock from the top of 
the beach to the low water mark because such a structure would be utterly useless.  
57. Delaware Special Master Brief, supra note 53, at 47–59. 
58. A core riparian right. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 34 (4th ed. 2009) 
(stating that approving and regulating wharves for the purpose of accessing navigable water is a core 
riparian right).  




devoted very little space arguing that the parties’ course of conduct 
actually supports Delaware’s ability to say “no” to the Crown Landing 
project.59 Delaware argued that, since its first regulatory laws in 1969, it 
has expressly permitted every structure appurtenant to New Jersey’s shore 
extending into the Twelve-Mile Circle without objection from New 
Jersey.60 Critically, Delaware denied a permit in 1971 to El Paso to build 
a similar facility.61 In addition, Delaware argued that its minimal common 
law regulation of structures was not an abandonment of the right to 
regulate; instead, it only regulated nuisance, which it did not have occasion 
to do regarding wharves attached to New Jersey’s shore.62 It is unclear 
why Delaware treated this argument in such a cursory fashion at this point 
in the litigation; this seems like a fairly strong argument that New Jersey 
acquiesced to concurrent regulation, and not the other way around.63  
 Notably, Delaware ended its brief to the Supreme Court with a 
slightly more extensive treatment of the “course of conduct” argument, 
persuasively expanding the two points it argued to the Special Master.  
First, Delaware argued that its minimal pre-1960s regulation indicated that 
Delaware was only regulating nuisances, not that it was failing to regulate 
at all.64 Second, Delaware argued that New Jersey’s failure to protest (and, 
further, its explicit recognition of) Delaware’s previous regulations of 
projects appurtenant to New Jersey’s shore indicated that New Jersey 
acquiesced to Delaware’s regulatory authority.65  
 As they were with New Jersey’s counsel, the Justices at Oral 
Argument were primarily concerned with setting a limit on Delaware’s 
regulatory authority. Justice Souter very quickly asked Delaware’s 
counsel a number of questions about the limits of Delaware’s arguments, 
posing the following hypothetical: “Delaware says enough is enough; no 
more wharfs and piers from the New Jersey side.”66 Delaware’s lawyer 
                                                 
59. Delaware Special Master Brief, supra note 53, at 45–46.  
60. Id.   
61. Id. at 45.  
62. Id. 
63. Delaware’s lawyers may have thought that they would lose this argument, so they buried the 
counter-argument deep in the brief. Alternatively, Delaware’s lawyers may have thought the point 
about prescription and acquiescence so obviously fell in their favor (or was a “wash”) that their limited 
space was better-spent arguing against the textual basis of New Jersey’s claim. It would have been 
odd, indeed, for Delaware to fight New Jersey’s jurisdiction over and ownership of the Delaware River 
only to have acquiesced to New Jersey’s exclusive regulation of that river. 
64. Delaware Supreme Court Brief, supra note 30, at 44.  
65. Id. at 45–48.  
66. Oral Argument, supra note 51, at 29:47.  
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was understandably reluctant to admit that the logical consequence of this 
argument would be Delaware’s veto power of any project proposed by 
New Jersey; such a result would seem contrary to the Compact’s express 
preservation of New Jersey’s “riparian jurisdiction.” A frustrated Justice 
Souter pursued this line of questioning until Justice Kennedy accused 
Delaware’s counsel of “running away from the hypothetical.”67 After 
wrangling with the Court about the issue, Delaware finally gave an inch 
and agreed with Justice Souter: “Delaware can prevent [a wharf] only on 
the grounds of preventing a nuisance.”68 It is this hook that gives Justice 
Ginsburg the limiting principle she writes into the Opinion and Decree.69 
 In front of the Court, Delaware made a choice to make this case about 
sovereignty instead of the environment. Especially because of its big win 
in front of the Special Master,70 Delaware's counsel would assuredly have 
been pleased with a cursory opinion mirroring the Special Master's Report. 
Concern for environmental values, and how they weigh against economic 
values, could only complicate what was a straightforward set of winning 
arguments for Delaware. Its position was not ostensibly pro-environment; 
it was pro-sovereignty. That the regulation at issue was an environmental 
one hardly entered the argument at all, which helped the Special Master 
and the Court avoid an otherwise ideological battle. 
C. The Resolution 
 Delaware won in front of the Special Master, who, having carefully 
considered the arguments, decided that Delaware has full police power 
jurisdiction over wharves extending into its own territory.71 While the 
result was a big win for Delaware, the Special Master rejected the strongest 
version of Delaware’s police power argument, writing that it “defies 
common sense.”72 Further, the Special Master found that Delaware’s 
contention that it had exclusive jurisdiction to regulate outshore of the low 
water mark within the Twelve-Mile Circle “effectively would render 
Article VII meaningless.”73 The Compact, negotiated before the issue of 
                                                 
67. Id. at 31:53. 
68. Id. at 52:04. It is worth noting that this limitation actually came from a question posed by 
Justice Ginsburg in response to New Jersey’s arguments about Delaware’s failure to regulate: “It's 
rather recent that Delaware has gotten into the business of regulating at all. I thought that for most of 
this period until the '60s, Delaware just wasn't doing anything unless something was a nuisance, and 
that didn't come up.” Id. at 42:42. 
69. See infra Section III.C. 
70. Id.  
71. Special Master Report, supra note 1, at 84. 
72. Id. at 36. 
73. Id. at 38. 




subaqueous land ownership, could not possibly have contemplated that the 
resolution of that issue would have stripped New Jersey of the ability to 
build wharves; in fact, the language clearly indicates that the opposite 
result was intended. 
 However, New Jersey’s victory on this point was a hollow one. The 
Special Master went on to make a textual argument that “riparian 
jurisdiction” is distinguishable from “exclusive jurisdiction.”74 The 
Special Master applied a presumption against the defeat of sovereign title 
absent express provisions in a Compact.75 The Special Master’s Report, as 
well as the case, could have actually ended right here, for if jurisdiction 
over the area in question is concurrent, rather than exclusive, Delaware 
was within its authority to deny the Crown Landing permit. 
 The Special Master, however, went on to agree with Delaware’s 
“course of conduct” argument, carefully analyzing this reasoning and 
dedicating several pages to carefully resolving it in Delaware’s favor.76 
Additionally, the Special Master noted the fact that New Jersey clearly 
consented to Delaware’s involvement in the regulation of wharves 
extending outshore of the low water mark on New Jersey’s side of the 
Delaware River,77 and that Delaware apparently did not abandon its 
jurisdiction.78 Given the Report’s strong support towards Delaware, New 
Jersey entered the Supreme Court at a disadvantage.79 
                                                 
74. Id. at 62. 
75. Id. at 34–35. Had the parties intended for the grant of jurisdiction to be exclusive, they would 
have used clear language to effectuate their intent. Id. at 65. The Special Master compares this 
Compact to one negotiated between New Jersey and New York in 1834, which granted “the exclusive 
right of property” to subaqueous land to New Jersey. Id. at 66. 
76. Id.  
77. Id. at 77–84. 
78. Id. at 69–70. 
79. The Special Master proposed the following substantive portions of the Decree:  
1. (a) The State of New Jersey may, under its laws, grant and thereafter exercise riparian 
jurisdiction over rights for the construction, maintenance and use of wharves and other 
riparian improvements appurtenant to the eastern shore of the Delaware River within the 
twelve-mile circle and extending outshore of the low water mark; and further 
(b) The State of Delaware may exercise, under its laws, full police power jurisdiction over 
the construction, maintenance and use of those same wharves and other improvements ap-
purtenant to the eastern shore of the Delaware River within the twelve-mile circle insofar 
as they extend outshore of the low water mark onto its sovereign territory. 
Appendices, supra note 19, at A-1–A-2. 
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 The “course of conduct” argument, upon which the Court partially 
based its decision, can be reframed in light of the underlying dispute 
between economic and environmental values. From Delaware's 
perspective, Delaware had always reserved the right to regulate 
environmental nuisances, and it directly regulated numerous projects on 
the Delaware River, including those appurtenant to New Jersey's shore. 
Delaware argued that it always retained the right to protect the 
environment in the Twelve-Mile Circle, and over time, the State had 
enhanced its protection of the environment as the public’s policy 
preferences evolved. The resolution of this argument is dispositive of the 
dispute. In fact, the interpretation of the text of the Compact is driven by 
the resolution of the “course of conduct” issue. If the parties have regulated 
since 1905 in a certain manner under the authority of the Compact, then 
the Compact will be read to support that conduct. In resolving the "course 
of conduct" argument in Delaware's favor, the Court explicitly upheld 
Delaware's privileging of environmental over economic values. 
 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, did not accept the Special 
Master’s approach but still ruled in favor of Delaware.80 The Court gives 
four principal reasons for allowing Delaware to prevent the Crown 
Landing project from going forward. First, the term “riparian jurisdiction” 
is what the Court calls a “limiting modifier,” and is not a stand-in for the 
phrase “exclusive jurisdiction.”81 Second, the New York-New Jersey 
Compact supports that construction.82 Third, the Court limited Virginia v. 
Maryland to its particular facts and refused to apply the same reasoning to 
this case.83 Finally, the Court accepted Delaware’s argument that New 
Jersey had acquiesced to Delaware’s concurrent jurisdiction by its past 
actions.84  
 The key point to understand, however, is the difference between the 
Special Master’s suggestion, which Justice Stevens fully supports in his 
concurring opinion, and the Court’s ultimate Decree. The Special Master 
suggested that New Jersey and Delaware had concurrent jurisdiction, 
which was subject to Delaware’s exercise of police power over the activity 
conducted on wharves. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, held that 
                                                 
80. New Jersey v. Delaware III, 552 U.S. 597, 623 (2008) (stating that “it was within Delaware’s 
authority to prohibit construction of the facility within its domain.”). 
81. Id. at 609. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. See Stuart A. Raphael, Practical Considerations in Original Action Litigation: Virginia 
v. Maryland and New Jersey v. Delaware, 12 WYO. L. REV. 15 (2012) (discussing the Court’s 
limitation of Virginia to its facts and the extraordinary room parties have to litigate original actions in 
the Court). 
84. New Jersey III, 552 U.S. at 609. 




“New Jersey and Delaware have overlapping authority to regulate riparian 
structures and operations of extraordinary character extending outshore 
of New Jersey’s domain into territory over which Delaware is 
sovereign.”85 
 The consequence of this holding is that Delaware does not have 
concurrent jurisdiction to regulate developments that are not “of 
extraordinary character.” This is the limiting principle Justice Souter was 
seeking during Oral Argument. Though much of the language of the 
Opinion seems to read heavily in favor of Delaware’s sovereignty, this 
grant of concurrent jurisdiction is actually quite narrow. The Court admits 
in a footnote that, under its holding, “Delaware could not rationally” 
prohibit “a terminal for unloading cargoes of tofu and bean sprouts.”86 
 With characteristic rancor, Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion 
in which Justice Alito joined.87 Justice Scalia took issue with the 
majority’s “extraordinary character” test as vague and poorly grounded in 
precedent.88 After listing and systematically dismissing a series of reasons 
why the majority might have picked this standard, Justice Scalia concluded 
with a jab at the “environmentally sensitive Court” for making its 
decision.89 To Justice Scalia, the majority made an instrumental decision 
that it failed to legally justify.90 Justice Scalia concludes that “[t]he wharf 
at issue in this litigation would have been viewed as an ordinary and usual 
riparian use at the time the two States entered into the 1905 Compact,” 
and, therefore, New Jersey ought to have exclusive authority to regulate 
it.91 
 Additionally, the dissent gives a detailed account of how the framers 
of the Compact would have understood the riparian right to wharf out.92 
Justice Scalia rejects the Special Master’s comparison of the Compact at 
issue to the New York-New Jersey Compact, and instead equates the 
phrase “riparian jurisdiction of every kind and nature” with the phrase 
                                                 
85. Id. at 603 (emphasis added). 
86. Id. at 623. The question of tofu and bean sprouts does not appear in any of the briefs, nor 
was it mentioned at Oral Argument. One can only imagine this colorful language arising out of a 
heated debate between Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia during one of the Court’s conferences. 
87. Id. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88. Id. at 640–44. 
89. Id. 
90. Ironically, Justice Scalia then dives into an equally irrelevant discussion of the economic 
value of the Crown Landing project to BP and New Jersey. Id. at 644-45. 
91. Id. at 646. 
92. Id. at 631. 
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“exclusive jurisdiction.”93 He explains that because wharfing out was, and 
is, a core stick in the bundle of riparian land ownership, an express grant 
of this jurisdiction ought to give each state exclusive authority to regulate 
riparian developments on its own shore.94 
 Justice Scalia also robustly deals with Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 
56 (2003).95 In that case, the Court held that Virginia (in a similar situation 
as New Jersey) may “construct improvements appurtenant to the Virginia 
shore of the Potomac River free of regulation by Maryland.”96 Despite the 
textual differences between the arbitration award at issue in Virginia and 
the Compact at issue in this case, the most committed textualist on the 
Court wrote: “The documents in Virginia v. Maryland said in other words 
precisely what the Compact here said.”97 Therefore, Justice Scalia fully 
accepts New Jersey’s argument that the words “continue to exercise 
riparian jurisdiction” in Article VII indicate that the parties’ course of 
conduct supports New Jersey, and that, because Delaware had not sought 
to regulate developments appurtenant to New Jersey’s shore before the 
1905 Compact, it gave up the jurisdiction to do so after 1905.98 
 Among the various opinions, Justice Scalia's dissent comes closest to 
characterizing this case as environmental. Given his devotion to 
textualism,99 it is hard not to notice a dissent in which he conflates 
admittedly-different textual provisions and makes bold instrumentalist 
assertions. Justice Scalia is only able to recruit Justice Alito to join him in 
this dissent, despite the fact that these two Justices are not the only 
conservative members of the Roberts Court. The fact that this decision cuts 
across ideological lines, and is explicitly decided on non-environmental 
grounds, indicates that the Court has other concerns in mind than ideology 
when resolving these interstate disputes.100 
  The reach of this Opinion in future disputes between these or other 
parties is not exactly clear. Given the Court’s willingness to limit Virginia 
v. Maryland to its facts, this Opinion may have no impact in future 
jurisdictional disputes. Thus, understanding the future impacts of the 
                                                 
93. Id. at 633–34. For an explanation of the importance of the New York-New Jersey Compact 
to the Special Master’s decision, see note 75 and accompanying text. 
94. Id. at 632. 
95. Id. at 638. The parties wrangled over this case in their briefs, with New Jersey arguing that 
it controls the outcome and Delaware arguing it should be confined to its facts. 
96. Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 79 (2003). 
97. New Jersey III, 552 U.S. at 639. 
98. Id. at 632–33. 
99. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). 
100. See infra Part IV for a discussion about the litigation strategy the Court opens up in this 
case. 




particular decision may be unnecessary fortune telling, but understanding 
the substantive drivers of this Opinion may help litigants predict and shape 
outcomes in future environmental cases. Part IV explores these forces. 
IV. DRIVING THE DECISION: THREE UNDERLYING FACTORS 
 At first blush, it may be surprising to see the Court announce a new 
limiting principle (“extraordinary character”) for the purpose of defining 
“riparian jurisdiction” while providing very little analysis to either justify 
its adoption or define its applicability. However, Part IV argues that the 
Court's adoption of this test actually falls in line with long-standing 
common law principles. Furthermore, in deciding the case in this manner, 
the Court has illuminated a path by which pro-environment litigants may 
win cases, even against strong business and economic interests. Section 
IV.A explores the way in which the Court's resolution of the case brings 
the law full circle; regulating structures of "extraordinary character" seems 
quite similar to regulating nuisance. Second, Section IV.B argues that the 
Court's decision is consistent with modern state water law. Finally, Section 
IV.C argues that the Court has given policymakers and litigators with 
otherwise unpopular environmental cases a roadmap for success. The 
Court remains a legal forum; as long as state environmental regulations 
are consistent with history and law, they can trump even new and powerful 
economic interests. 
A. Full Circle: Regulation of Nuisance 
 In many ways, regulating structures of “extraordinary character” is 
quite similar to regulating nuisances. From the beginning of the dispute 
over the LNG facility, one of New Jersey’s key arguments was that 
Delaware did not begin regulating the Twelve-Mile Circle until relatively 
recently.101 Until 1969, Delaware regulated riparian improvements 
outshore of the low water mark on the eastern side of the Delaware River 
only when such improvements constituted a public nuisance under the 
common law.102 Though the Court rejected this argument as a reason to 
hold that New Jersey had exclusive regulatory authority, the Court 
                                                 
101. See supra Section III.A. 
102. Id. On the ground, Delaware was not doing very much, if any, management of development 
in this area. Special Master Report, supra note 1, at 69–70. 
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accepted the facts underpinning this assertion and used them to craft its 
ultimate solution.103  
 Public nuisance is not an easy claim to make. The comment to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979) § 821B Public Nuisance lists a 
number of actions that would constitute a public nuisance: “keeping 
diseased animals,” “shooting of fireworks,” “loud and disturbing noises,” 
“obstruction of a public highway or navigable stream,” and other 
“unreasonable interference[s] with a right common to the general 
public.”104 Notably, “[i]n each of these instances the interference with the 
public right was so unreasonable that it was held to constitute a criminal 
offense.”105 Accordingly, public nuisance at common law has traditionally 
been reserved for particularly egregious and obnoxious conduct.106 In 
other words, public nuisance law could step in to prohibit “operations of 
extraordinary character,”107 but not mere annoyances. 
 The Supreme Court’s creation of an “extraordinary character” test 
brings the law full circle and allows Delaware to regulate only those 
structures that would constitute a public nuisance. For environmentalists, 
this may be disappointing, though some have argued for an expanded 
understanding of nuisance law in the context of environmental 
protection.108 The Court’s “new” test is driven by the principle underlying 
long-standing tort law: both parties in this dispute should be in 
approximately the same position they have always been relative to each 
other. New Jersey primarily builds and regulates structures extending into 
the river, and Delaware can only get involved when they constitute a 
nuisance.109 
                                                 
103. See supra Section III.C. 
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). 
105. Id. 
106. Interstate nuisance, the tort that would technically apply here, is governed by similar 
principles. See Missouri v. Illinois II, 200 U.S. 496, 522 (1906) (Missouri’s scant evidence did not 
meet the “strictest proof” necessary to prove an interstate nuisance claim). 
107. New Jersey v. Delaware III, 552 U.S. 597, 603 (2008). 
108. See, e.g., Robert Haskell Adams, Broadening Narrow Perspectives and Nuisance Law: 
Protecting Ecosystem Services in the ACF Basin, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 243, 273 (2007). Given 
the Court’s insistence on a limiting principle in this case, however, it would be surprising for this Court 
to start expanding the definition of “nuisance” (or, “extraordinary character”) to start covering more 
environmental harms. 
109. It may seem odd, however, that the Court did not just invoke the tried-and-true law of 
nuisance. The Court has a history of using nuisance to regulate interstate water disputes. See, e.g., 
Missouri v. Illinois I, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (Missouri’s claim that Chicago’s rerouting of its sewage 
into the Mississippi River could be brought to the Supreme Court under an interstate nuisance claim). 
In line with the Restatement, the Court has set a high bar for allowing nuisance claims to succeed. See 
Missouri v. Illinois II, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (Missouri’s evidence did not meet the strict proof necessary 
to prove an interstate nuisance claim). Federal common law, however, is very rare and can be displaced 
by federal statutes. For instance, the Clean Water Act has displaced the law of interstate nuisance when 




 Thus, the Court gives its first lesson to environmental litigants: pro-
environment arguments consistent with longstanding common law 
principles can win. However, it is important to note that this case was not 
framed as a common law public nuisance case, or an environmental case. 
In the briefs, the dispute was framed strictly as a textual and contractual 
matter.110 Only when questioned at Oral Argument did the use of nuisance 
as a limiting principle even arise.111 Delaware’s counsel was 
understandably uncomfortable adopting this limiting principle; although 
this concession ultimately paved the way for his win, it undercut his textual 
and contractual arguments.112 However, properly framed and limited by 
historical context, Delaware had little reason to fear this limitation, at least 
as it applies to the resolution of this case. 
B. Consistency with Modern Water Law 
 Basic principles of state water law drive the solution in this case. The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses reasonable use of water as 
follows: “A riparian proprietor is subject to liability for making an 
unreasonable use of . . . water . . . that causes harm to another riparian 
proprietor’s reasonable use of water or his land.”113 Determining whether 
a use is reasonable is a decision to be based on a number of factors, none 
of which is dispositive.114 Further, this decision uses a basic balancing test 
that has been used in the eastern United States since the mid-nineteenth 
century.115 
                                                 
it comes to interstate pollution cases. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). The issue here 
is similar: New Jersey v. Delaware III is governed by a Compact, which has the force of federal law. 
Thus, despite the fact that the Court explicitly referenced nuisance during the Oral Argument, it could 
not issue an opinion resting on federal common law. Instead, the Court created a standard based on 
the Compact that would do substantially the same work as the nuisance standard. 
110. See supra Section III.A. See also supra Section III.B. 
111. See supra Section III.B. 
112. If the Court were truly taking seriously the principle that Delaware’s reserved rights in the 
Compact after New Jersey v. Delaware II gave Delaware power to regulate structures built into its 
sovereign land, such sovereignty would not naturally be so limited by so strong a principle as public 
nuisance. 
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1979). 
114. Id. at § 850A. These factors include the “purpose of the use,” the suitability of the water, 
the economic and social values of the use, the harm caused, the ability of each party to avoid the harm, 
the protection of the existing values of the water use, and “the justice of requiring the user causing 
harm to bear the loss.” Id. 
115. 1–6 JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01 (Amy L. Kelley et al. 
eds., 3rd ed. 2014). It is interesting to note, here, that New Jersey’s argument about prescription and 
acquiescence would privilege pre-existing claims to the use of the water, rather than claims based on 
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 The Court’s newly introduced “extraordinary character” test seeks 
essentially the same information as a “reasonable use” test. A terminal like 
the Crown Landing would likely fail on a number of the factors that 
determine whether a use is reasonable.116 By contrast, a ship carrying tofu 
and bean sprouts, or a wharf constructed for the purpose of allowing small 
fishing boats on the water, would likely be considered a reasonable 
riparian use.117 Thus, the delineation of the extremes the Court mentions 
fit well within the boundaries of modern state water law.118 In fact, it is not 
terribly surprising or unusual for the Court to resolve interstate water 
disputes with an eye towards the background of state law.119 In this case, 
state water law gave the Supreme Court yet another way to comfortably 
rule in favor of environmental regulations. In future cases concerning 
environmental issues, parties would do well to carefully consider 
background principles of state and federal common law, as such principles 
might drive otherwise surprising outcomes. 
 Even so, it is strange to see the Court turn to principles of state law 
to resolve a dispute between conflicting state laws. The reason for this may 
be found in the Court’s unusual positioning in this case. Unlike the vast 
majority of cases it decides, the Court heard this case under its original 
jurisdiction. Though the Court used the Special Master to make the case 
look more like an appellate case, the Order and Decree was the first—and 
only—binding decision the parties would receive. Both States had clear 
and substantial interests in the Court protecting their sovereignty, and the 
Court had an interest in maintaining its legitimacy as a forum for civil 
                                                 
ownership of the land. Though the Restatement § 850A(h) does indicate that “the protection of existing 
values of water uses” are to be considered, that concept comes from the “prior appropriation” doctrine 
common to western states. 2–12 OWEN L. ANDERSON, ROBERT E. BECK, &  
C. PETER GOPLERUD III, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 12.01–02 (Amy L. Kelley et al. eds., 3rd 
ed. 2014). Perhaps that explains the Court’s hostility to New Jersey’s acquiescence claim and its 
simultaneous acceptance of Delaware’s. 
116. It would cause extensive harm and disruption to the Delaware River, it would be hard for 
the terminal to take up any less space or be any less intrusive of the public’s use and enjoyment of 
adjacent land, and it seems to be more just, on balance, to require BP to bear the loss of the foregone 
opportunity to build a terminal than the citizens of Delaware to bear the burden of the nuisance without 
the corollary economic benefits. While it is true that the terminal would have economic value, that 
economic value would inure primarily to New Jersey and its citizens, though the nuisance would have 
been equally borne by Delaware’s people. 
117. DELLAPENNA, supra note 115. 
118. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95 MARQ. 
L. REV. 53, 53 n.1 (2011) (casting New Jersey v. Delaware III as an application of state riparian law 
to a federal dispute). 
119. Compare New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931) (balancing two states’ interests in 
line with riparian reasonable use principles), with Colorado v. New Mexico II, 467 U.S. 310 (1984) 
(privileging prior use of water in New Mexico over Colorado’s proposed use in line with western 
water law—prior appropriation—principles). 




resolution of this controversy. Thus, instead of blindly applying canons of 
interpretation to the Compact, or worse, openly balancing policy interests, 
the Court reached to slyly incorporate state law into its decision. By doing 
so, it invoked legal principles to which both States would likely agree. 
Though the Court’s resolution necessarily had to impinge on state 
sovereignty in order to resolve this dispute, it did so in a way consistent 
with the States’ own conception of water disputes and, thus, brought 
legitimacy to its decision. 
C. An Environmental Case? 
 Commentators have quibbled over whether the Roberts Court is truly 
an anti-environment Court.120 In this case, Justice Ginsburg wrote an 
opinion for a majority comprised of herself, Chief Justice Roberts, and 
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas—hardly a left-wing alliance 
determined to trade economic development for a clean river. For those in 
favor of robust environmental protections, this case can be understood 
with hope. Had this case been argued as an “environment versus the 
economy case,” and the Court had split along typical ideological lines 
(with Justice Breyer recused), the case likely would have been decided in 
favor of the interests of New Jersey and BP. Despite the fact that the Court 
openly privileged tofu and bean sprouts over natural gas under similar 
circumstances, the Court made its decision based on long-standing legal 
principles,121 not environmental policy preferences.122 
 Because this case was not decided on an ideological basis, i.e. as an 
“environmental case,” understanding the underlying principles that 
governed the course of the case may be useful for attempting to predict 
                                                 
120. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts Court: A 
Preliminary Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943 (2009) (arguing that the Roberts Court has 
been far more “pro-government” than “pro-business”). See also Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s 
Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703 (2000) 
(arguing that the Court does not even really outwardly appreciate the “environmental” character of its 
environmental cases). 
121. These came especially from state law. See supra Section IV.A and Section IV.B for an 
explanation. 
122. There is, of course, considerable debate as to the role of policy preferences in courts, 
particularly the Supreme Court. See generally Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, Does Legal 
Doctrine Matter?: Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 102 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 369 (2008) (using a different method of data analysis to argue against the traditional notion 
that policy drives Supreme Court decisions); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values 
and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989) (providing significant 
evidence that ideological preferences play a large role in judicial decision making). 
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outcomes and the Court’s approach in future cases. New Jersey v. 
Delaware III, due to its nature as an original jurisdiction case, gave the 
parties the opportunity to engage in extremely creative lawyering.123 As 
the terms of the Compact were unique and hardly analogous even to other 
similar compacts, the Court turned to historical context and state water law 
to resolve the dispute.124 However, the choice to frame it as a contractual 
argument, not an environmental argument, helped prevent ideology from 
trumping sound legal reasoning. If the Court is given solid legal principles 
upon which it can build a foundation for environmental protection, it will 
do so. 
 At the end of the day, it may be that the Roberts Court will favor the 
environment, at least inadvertently, so long as pro-environmental 
regulations fit into the long-standing frameworks of the law. For 
policymakers and environmental litigants, this is not a reason to despair. 
Instead, the road to environmental protection lies in creative lawyers 
understanding how to make pro-environmental arguments by relying on 
established legal precedent, without resorting to soft policy arguments that 
may amount to requests for the Court to openly balance environmental 
harms against economic gains. When presented with legal precedent—
even outdated federal common law or formally inapplicable state law—
and persuasive arguments based thereon, the Court will likely follow the 
letter of the law and reject policy based decisions upon which such 
litigants might otherwise attempt to rely. The Roberts Court may even be 
willing to create new tests to effectively resolve environmental disputes. 
We do not need a lawyer for the trees; we need a lawyer who understands 
how the trees fit into the jungle of the law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The Opinion of the Court—though it was a compromise between two 
States’ claims of jurisdiction—was decidedly pro-environment and anti-
business. It was pro-environment because Delaware’s denial of the permit 
was based on laws specifically geared toward preventing heavy industrial 
use in the Delaware River.125 The decision was anti-business because the 
immediate effect was to end BP’s ability to construct the Crown Landing 
                                                 
123. See Raphael, supra note 83. 
124. See Dellapenna, supra note 118 at 53 n.1. See also Matthew F. Boyer, The Role of Historical 
Context in New Jersey v. Delaware III (2008), 11 DEL. L. REV. 101, 123 (2010) (arguing that historical 
context was “more than just one consideration among many” in this dispute; instead, it was 
dispositive). 
125. See supra Section II.B. 




project in the Delaware River; furthermore, Delaware’s laws can proscribe 
any other similar uses.126 
 The result in this case may seem odd for two reasons. First, the Court 
announced a brand new test for adjudicating interstate conflicts under this 
Compact. Given many Justices’ affinity for textualism, history, and 
tradition, this result is rather striking. Properly understood, however, the 
“extraordinary character” test connects the parties’ past co-regulation, 
historic federal common law, and state water law. 
 Second, despite this obvious pro-environmental result, the case was 
deliberately framed in non-environmental terms. Only Justice Scalia even 
gestures toward characterizing this case as environmental. This 
characterization may seem odd because the dispute between the States is, 
fundamentally, a policy dispute about the value of environmental 
protection versus economic gains; Delaware’s laws supported the 
former—New Jersey’s, the latter. In front of a Court that has been 
characterized as pro-business and anti-environment, however, litigants 
need to be aware that even compelling policy arguments will fall on deaf 
ears. Instead, the most successful strategies will dig deep into legal history 
and state law to argue for pro-environment solutions that square with 
history and tradition. 
 New Jersey and Delaware have been fighting for more than a century 
over the Delaware River. These disagreements boiled over in 2005 after 
Delaware authorities denied BP a permit to build an LNG terminal in the 
Delaware River inside the Twelve-Mile Circle. After hearings in front of 
the Special Master and the Supreme Court, the Court resolved the issue 
rather narrowly in Delaware’s favor. Though the Court seemingly 
invented a new test—the “extraordinary character” test—to justify its 
holding, the test actually is well grounded in long-standing legal 
principles. Even if the “extraordinary character” test never appears again, 
the principles that drive it certainly will, and future environmental litigants 
would be wise to understand those principles in order to win future cases 
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